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Wrap-Up: Tomorrow's Bankruptcy Issues*
Professor Douglas 'Baird, Martin Bienenstock,
Mr. David Fischer & Mr. Marc Kieselstein
MR. KIESELSTEIN: One trend that I'm seeing, and I think it's start-
ing to pick up supportive case law, is the notion of short-cutting some
of the requirements of § 1129, that is all the elaborate requirements
you have to do to confirm the plan.
And I'll just give you one example in a couple of cases that we've
done, not published opinions, but precedent from influential judges, is
the notion of deemed consent for administrative claims.
The rule in Chapter 11 is if you want to get out of bankruptcy, you
can compromise your prepetition claims. You can put them to a vote.
But administrative claims can't be compromised. They're not a class
for voting purposes. You've got to pay them a hundred cents on the
dollar at confirmation or later if their claim is allowed later, or they
have to agree to some other form of treatment. Section 1129 isn't
quite clear on that point.
We had a couple of cases, for example TWA-3, after we sold the
airline to Marty's client. They were thrilled with the purchase, by the
way. We went to confirm our liquidating plan, and it was not clear-
we thought we would be able to pay all administrative claims in full,
including Marty's clients, but it was not clear whether or not we'd be
able to do that. We certainly couldn't say with ironclad assurance as
of the petition date that we were going to do it, and we weren't in a
position to pay people on the petition date or on the confirmation
date.
So we sent out, in essence, a policy notice saying, "Dear Adminis-
trative Creditors: We're not in a position to pay your claims a full
hundred cents on the dollar. We understand what the Code says, but
you're better off this way because under Chapter 7, you do worse. If
we don't hear from you, we're just going to assume that you consented
to this provision."
* This is an edited version of the transcript from the sixth panel at the DEPAUL BUSINESS
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We got a lot of objections, and, of course, those people who ob-
jected couldn't object to the provision itself because we were not say-
ing you're not consenting. We understood that. You can't speak for
the people who haven't been heard from. We told them, let's go off in
a room. We'll work something out with you. What we worked out
with them 99 times out of 100 was convincing them that they were
better off just withdrawing their objection.
But Judge Walsh said proper notice was given. People had an op-
portunity to come in. Those that came in have now withdrawn their
objections. The vast majority of people haven't been heard from, and
I'm going to find that they consented to this provision. So you've sat-
isfied their administrative claims for these purposes, for confirmation
purposes.
MR. BIENENSTOCK: Did you give special treatment to those who
withdrew their objection?
MR. KIESELSTEIN: No. In certain instances, some people bought
their claims. Other people who wanted the thing to go away bought
their claim, but that was not the debtor. That was somebody else.
That was a transaction between two third parties and done in the Te-
ligent case as well.
MR. FISCHER: There's no way that holds up. There's no way.
MR. KIESELSTEIN: I'm living in the real world, David. It's held up
twice.
MR. FISCHER: I know, but did somebody- did I forget about this
2/3 and 50 percent, and that's for unsecureds. And now, if nobody
objects you're changing the Code as to this absolute priority rule?
MR. KIESELSTEIN: But apathy is not rewarded for unsecured
creditors.
MR. BIENENSTOCK: There's a Supreme Court decision that says
when members of a class take and appeal the confirmation, they can't
settle it by getting something extra for themselves and leave everyone
else in their class with different treatment.
Anyway, you succeeded. Congratulations.
MR. KIESELSTEIN: Well, I just think that this is the type of sort of
approach that you have to be increasingly clever these days, especially




And in truth, the result, if you look only at the result, is that the
Chapter 11 liquidation process was a lot better than would have been
bringing the trustee in under a Chapter 11 -
MR. FISCHER: What did the unsecureds get?
MR. KIESELSTEIN: What did the unsecureds get?
MR. FISCHER: In your plan.
MR. KIESELSTEIN: They got a little piece of the action that the
secured creditor was willing to throw their way.
MR. FISCHER: At arguably the expense of the other.
MR. KIESELSTEIN: That's not property of the estate. It's the se-
cured creditor's money to part with as he will.
MR. BIENENSTOCK: They used SPM.
MR. KIESELSTEIN: Yeah, SPM, which is another way of circum-
venting, shall we say, the plan confirmation. Well, this is where you
don't have enough to pay your unsecureds anything because your se-
cured is not getting paid in full. You need to get something to the
unsecureds, and rather than doing it in a way that would violate the
absolute priority rule, the secured creditor takes a piece of their re-
covery and skips it down to a lower class.
MR. BAIRD: And you're a hundred percent sure that doesn't violate
the absolute priority rule?
MR. KIESELSTEIN: I'm not a hundred percent sure of anything. I
know what I did.
MR. BAIRD: For those history buffs, the only problem with this ar-
rangement of bypassing the intermediate person is that the Supreme
Court held that you couldn't do it because-
MR. KIESELSTEIN: That was like a hundred years ago, Doug.
Come on.
MR. BIENENSTOCK: You can't do it with estate property.
MR. KIESELSTEIN: Right, you can't do it with estate property.
MR. KIESELSTEIN: And one other sort of related issue is-and this
is in the sale context-the ability to sell free and clear. What does
that mean, free and clear of what? There's a Third Circuit opinion
again in TWA that came down recently where there were flight at-
tendants who had settled a lawsuit. I think it was an age and shape
discrimination lawsuit from the early '90s, and these settling parties
received travel benefits, a certain amount of vouchers that they could
fly.
20031
606 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL
We went to sell to American. American had no interest or inten-
tion of honoring that program. We said we could sell it free and clear
of that claim. Judge Walsh ruled in our favor. It went up to the Third
Circuit who has now said that it is an interest in effect. Even though it
wasn't a money damage award, it could be reducible to money dam-
ages, and you could sell free and clear.
And I think the more clarity one can get about what free and clear
really means, the better off from a debtor's perspective you are in
using the sale route to, in essence some would say, circumvent through
a severance of plan creditors' democracy. Having it be the business
judgment of the debtor rather than put to a vote. So those issues I
think are going to roll out.
MR. BIENENSTOCK: Is it my turn? I think there are a couple
things we'll be seeing more of. This last summer we had a big steel
company, Republic Technology International, in Chapter 11 in Akron,
Ohio, and for a variety of reasons just couldn't put together a plan
that would be confirmed. And what we did was we saved the 2,500
jobs. We preserved the secured bank debt. We gave the bond debt
the value of their collateral in a new note bringing down the 450 mil-
lion to 80 million by way of a Section 363 sale. I think you're going to
see more situations where the company is reorganized, the jobs are
saved, and value is maximized in a sale as opposed to Chapter 11
plans.
Generally as to what's on the horizon, I start with what are the driv-
ers of our practice. The first two drivers, which I think share first
place are, number one, liquidity in the high yield market. When you
have high liquidity there, people don't need to resort to Chapter 11.
During the '90s the volume of debt being issued was gigantic, and
the investment banks kept staffing up their distressed trading desks on
the theory that if half the normal percentage of debt defaults that nor-
mally defaults, there would be an avalanche of bankruptcies in the
'90s. And they kept staffing up their distress desks, and there were no
defaults, practically none given the volume of debt outstanding. And
the reason was it was so easy to raise high-yield debt and equity to fix
problems, no one ever had to resort to Chapter 11.
That all changed in the year 2000 when liquidity in the high-yield
market disappeared. Largely, or certainly a contributing factor, was
the telecoms took so many billions of dollars out of the high-yield
funds, and it still hasn't come back. Even though we hear about tons
of capital waiting to go into the stock market, the high-yield market is
still barely liquid. And while those conditions exist, any type of li-
quidity problem has a higher likelihood of Chapter 11 going forward.
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The second driver of our business is what I call unplanned-for
change. I don't subscribe to what I call the accountant's point of view
or the crisis manager's point of view that failure is always due to bad
management. If I subscribe to that, I would have to say that all man-
agement in the airline industry and the telecom industry and the gyp-
sum wallboard industry, and the health care are incompetent, and
that's just not the case.
There are macroeconomic changes, sometimes governmental
changes that occur and that no good management has planned for.
That's why I call it the driver that's unplanned-for change. And when
you have 435 guys or 535 in Washington working on unexpected
change all the time, you have a driver for your business all the time.
The reduction in reimbursement costs for health care facilities that
Congress says it did, then relented, and then did again that's driving a
whole new field of health care Chapter 11 cases simply by doing that.
The unplanned-for changes recently have been deflation. You
know, I never thought the price of steel was going to go down; the
price of paper, down; the price of coal, down. Deflation can be a terri-
ble thing, especially if you're a borrower.
So since deflation remains one of Alan Greenspan's major obstacles
and this country's major obstacle, I think you're going to see in the
commodity industry major bankruptcies because no one can deal with
deflation.
The other thing happening is that with interest rates at a little over 1
percent and equity markets basically negative, maybe marginally posi-
tive, none of the pension plans, defined benefit plans earn their hurdle
rates. When you have a defined benefit pension plan, the money paid
in is calculated based on how much it has to earn over time to the
retiring ages of the people covered by the plan. And most companies,
plus or minus, have a hurdle rate of 7-1/2 percent. You can't buy good
paper today that yields 7-1/2 percent, certainly no governmental pa-
per. And you certainly can't think that you're going to earn 7-1/2 per-
cent in the stock market today. You may get lucky and pick a fund or
a stock, but if you're a big pension fund, you cannot make those as-
sumptions, which means you cannot make your hurdle rates.
What that means, the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation is go-
ing around refiguring the deficit funding, the deficiencies in all of the
defined pension plans across the United States that it guarantees.
This is going to cut across a lot of industries and create a lot of distress
because unless the market turns around in a hurry and there's a big
upside, these deficiencies ar6 going to swallow up these submajor
companies.
2003]
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MR. KIESELSTEIN: And I would agree, they're huge exit hurdles
for companies that are in. As we've seen with U.S. Airways, it had to
then go back after cutting the deal, thinking it had a prepack in es-
sence, and having to get extraordinary relief in terminating their pilot
pension plan because they could not make it out of Chapter 11 with-
out doing that.
MR. FISCHER: I think that the health care industry is going to go
totally haywire because of all the states' budgetary crises. I have rep-
resented a small mental health facility that receives 90 percent of its
money from the state in its reorganization. Every time the governor
would say something, our rate would change. And yet society has de-
cided, I think, that they don't care about these sorts of people, and
they are tied into the nursing home industry. And any quasi health
care or health care facility or social facility is a for-profit business-
but anybody who is in the business of taking care of people, who soci-
ety I guess has decided should be taken care of, is in for just this horri-
ble ride. And I'm not sure that the states have figured out what
they're going to do about it.
MR. BAIRD: I can identify four themes that relate to what we've
been saying here. First, I am a little concerned, actually, I'm greatly
concerned, by the disconnect I see between the Supreme Court's
bankruptcy opinions, and many appellate courts' bankruptcy opinions
on the one hand, and current bankruptcy practice on the other. A lot
of current bankruptcy practice does not lead to published opinions.
No one objected when United continued to honor frequent flyer miles
or even their prepetition claims that-
MR. FISCHER: How about putting the people on the planes who
had tickets?
MR. BIENENSTOCK: It's advertising. It's not-
MR. BAIRD: No, no, no, I know. My point, Marty, was not that
United wasn't doing this, but people on the ground never think of
even raising that issue. If you got up in front of the court and said to
Judge Wedoff, "Judge, we have to follow the letter of the Bankruptcy
Code. These are prepetition claims. This has to happen and this has
to happen. We can't honor existing tickets."
MR. FISCHER: Then buy your new ticket.
MR. BAIRD: People don't behave that way in bankruptcy court
but-
MR. KIESELSTEIN: Oh, no, we say these are prepetition claims,
and these are-and if we can't do this, these will be the consequences.
[Vol. 1:603
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MR. BIENENSTOCK: Everybody is worse off.
MR. FISCHER: Judge Grady would have said, no, you can't honor
those prepetition tickets.
MR. BAIRD: My only point is there are 300 people in the courtroom.
Everyone nods their head and think it's fine to honor existing tickets.
But if it gets to 9 individuals someplace else, I'm not sure they're go-
ing to agree. I'm not saying I like it. I teach the law. I don't make it.
MR. KIESELSTEIN: You have to get the confirmation before the
opinion comes out and not after.
MR. BAIRD: The second issue I would point to is following up on
what they said about asset sales in bankruptcy. Even by Lynn
LoPucki's count, and he I think is very, very low and undervalues this,
almost half these mega cases are asset sales. His figure is 47 percent.
I think it's actually higher than that. I asked Judge Fitzgerald for her
opinion and she said more than half although she was talking about all
Chapter 11 cases, not just mega cases. We now live in a world in
which you have asset sales, a world in which we have 203 North
LaSalle and the Supreme Court saying you have to pay attention to
the market, a world in which you're constantly using the market. It
doesn't simply mean Chapter 11 is a good vehicle for selling these
companies, which it is. It also means people are going to be thinking
about the market and valuing issues in a way they hadn't before.
I was on a panel last week with one of Marty's partners, and talked
about big valuation difficulties in Chapter 11. I talked about how it's
hard to value assets and so forth. And Marty's partner says, "Doug-
las, what's your problem? We just use the market to value
everything."
The idea that a lawyer from Weil Gotshal would say that to some-
one from the University of Chicago shows that the world is changing.
Not only do we have asset sales, but also the way people think about
bankruptcy is going to change whenever there are asset sales.
The third observation concerns the great frauds we've seen in the
last year in bankruptcy. I don't want to exaggerate. I mean,
WorldCom isn't a very elaborate fraud. It's primitive and disap-
pointing. Even Enron pales beside some of the great frauds we've
seen in, let's say, Equity Funding or some of the earlier cases of the
last century. I don't want to say that these frauds were done with any
style or finesse, but at a conference like this we might want to take
stock in what's going to happen to the law, and how are we going to
think about that.
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I would make the following prediction, and that is that what we'll
see is the rebirth of fraudulent conveyance law as we try to unwind
these transactions and figure out which party who still has money is
going to be tagged with what. Fraudulent conveyance law provides a
very flexible instrument of doing that in part because fraudulent con-
veyance law comes with it an ability to recharacterize transactions. I
agree, we should talk about the recharacterization process but we
should recognize that the engine that can allow the recharacterization
and allow the unravelling of a number of suspect transactions is fraud-
ulent conveyance law. We need to look not only at transactions that
are fraudulent conveyances because they are transfers made by an in-
solvent without reasonably equivalent value or transfer for less than
fair consideration, but also at transactions that are fraudulent convey-
ances because they are "badges of fraud." Under this branch of fraud-
ulent conveyance law, you don't have to find old-fashioned common
law fraud. It's enough if a transaction has a number of suspect charac-
teristics that serve no legitimate economic purpose or create no exter-
nal changes in the world as to who was running assets or who was
controlling assets. If a transaction has enough of these characteristics,
it's a fraudulent conveyance even if you can't prove common law
fraud and even if you can't show a transfer for less than the reasona-
bly equivalent value.
Cases like Enron, WorldCom and Adelphia that have a large
amount of misbehavior associated with them are likely to expand this
old and venerable branch of bankruptcy law.
Finally, we should also look at the trajectory of legislative change
and what that's going to mean. Two things are going on here. Con-
gress at the moment is very unhappy about employee compensation
both with respect to ordinary workers and high-level executives. The
rhetoric we always use is Chapter 11 saves jobs, but the reality is when
Chapter 11 is filed, the first thing that happens is a whole bunch of
people get laid off and are thrown out of work. The experience of the
line of everyday working-stiff employees in these large Chapter lls on
the one hand, and these very, very large payments being made to peo-
ple running firms in Chapter 11 on the other is creating force for legis-
lative change.
When you bring in a turnaround specialist with a proven track re-
cord, you can't be very surprised that he is demanding and getting a
lot of money. Nevertheless, retention bonuses to existing officers are
likely to come under increased scrutiny.
We are also likely to see some action in the realm of asset securi-
tization. There is general consensus that an old-fashioned nonre-
[Vol. 1:603
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course factoring arrangement gussied up with special-purpose vehicles
and securitized will be upheld.
What we do see happening, however, is legislation that's pushing
the envelope of what you can do with asset securitization. With that,
come a number of different threats to the bankruptcy system and the
integrity of the bankruptcy system.
In LTV, we had a special-purpose vehicle in which the inventory
was being transferred to a special-purpose vehicle, and it is claimed
that this inventory is, as a result, no longer property of the estate.
Because of the lawyer's magic, Molten steel on the factory floor
ceases to be property of the estate even though the debtors' employ-
ees are handling it every day.
To the extent that those kinds of transactions become more wide-
spread, again the face of bankruptcy law may change rather
substantially.

